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A Special Needs Exception to the Warrant and 
Probable Cause Requirements for Mandatory and 
Uniform Pre-Arraignment Drug Testing in the 
Wake of Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' 
Association and National Treasury Employees' 
Union v. Von Raab 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Until 1989, the Supreme Court had not addressed Fourth 
Amendment limitations on the use of mandatory, suspicionless 
urine testing by the federal government aimed at detecting 
drug use. Recently, however, in Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives' Association 1 and National Treasury Employees' 
Union v. Von Raab,2 the Court upheld federal regulations 
which broadly expanded the circumstances and conditions un-
der which urine testing could occur in the public sector and the 
government regulated workplace.3 
Until recently, the systematic testing of arrestees for drug 
use was uncommon. However, due to the epidemic of drug 
use,4 and the rapid advances made in testing technology,5 sev 
1. 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
2. 489 u.s. 656 (1989). 
3. For recent articles written on Skinner and Von Raab see Michael A. Mass, 
Public Sector Drug Testing: A Balancing Approach and the Search for a New Equi-
librium, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 231 (1990); George E. Warner, Jr., Note, The Rati-
fication of the "Special Needs" Analysis to Employer Substance Abuse Testing: 
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 13 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 167 (1989); Alyssa C. Westover, Note, National Treasury Employees Union v. 
Von Raab--Will the War Against Drugs Abrogate Constitutional Guarantees?, 17 
PEPP. L. REV. 793 (1990). For articles focusing on drug testing in the criminal 
justice system see Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Fourth Amendment Implications of Urine 
Testing for Evidence of Drug Abuse in Probation, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 1159 (1990); 
Cathryn Jo Rosen & John S. Goldkamp, The Constitutionality of Drug Testing at 
the Bail Stage, 80 J. CRIM. 1. & CRIMINOLOGY 114 (1989); Richard B. Abell, Pretri-
al Drug Testing: Expanding Rights and Protecting Public Safety, 57 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 943 (1989). 
4. Recently, the Bush Administration's "Drug Czar" observed some success in 
the "War on Drugs" by noting that from 1985 to 1990 the estimated number of 
illicit drug users dropped from 23 million to 13 million. Governor Bob Martinez, 
Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, Address at the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference Convention in Birmingham, AL, Federal News 
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eral jurisdictions now routinely request arrestees to submit to 
pre-arraignment drug tests. Fueling this trend has been re-
search showing a positive correlation between drug use by 
arrestees and their propensity to either fail to appear for court 
hearings or commit additional criminal acts while released 
pending trial.6 Moreover, President Bush's call for increased 
drug testing at every stage of the criminal justice 
process-including pretrial testing-signals the political mo-
mentum behind the drug testing push. 7 
This comment examines Fourth Amendment limitations on 
the current practice in the District of Columbia of mandatory 
drug testing of all adult arrestees for the purpose of gathering 
bail related information before each arrestee makes an initial 
appearance before a bail-setting judge. Part II briefly describes 
the background to the establishment of pre-arraignment drug 
testing in the District of Columbia and in other jurisdictions. 
Part III reviews the current practice of pre-arraignment drug 
testing programs based on the District of Columbia model. Part 
IV introduces the facts and analyses of Skinner and Von Raab. 
Part V applies the Skinner and Von Raab rationale to the Dis-
trict of Columbia drug testing program. Finally, this comment 
concludes that careful and structured use of pre-arraignment 
drug testing will fit well within the Fourth Amendment drug 
testing parameters established by the Supreme Court in Skin-
ner and Von Raab. 
Service, August 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Federal News Service 
File. He cautioned, however, that addicts pose the greatest threat to society and 
their numbers have not significantly decreased. ld. 
5. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 1162 n.9 and accompanying text. 
6. See generally JOHN A. CARVER, U.S. DEp'T OF JUSTICE, DRUGS AND CRIME: 
CONTROLLING USE AND REDUCING RISK THROUGH TESTING (SepJOct. 1986); BER-
NARD A. GROPPER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROBING THE LINKS BETWEEN DRUGS 
AND CRIME (Feb. 1985); Douglas A. Smith et a!., Drug Use and Pretrial Misconduct 
in New York City 5 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 101, 102 (1989); MARY A. 
TOBERG & MICHAEL P. KIRBY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUG USE AND PRETRIAL 
CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Oct. 1984); Christy A. Visher, Using Drug 
Testing to Identify High-Risk Defendants on Release: A Study in the District of Co-
lumbia 18 J. CRIM. JUST. 321 (1990); ERIC D. WISH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUG 
USE FORECASTING: NEW YORK 1984 TO 1986 (Feb. 1987); ANTHONY M.J. YEZER ET 
AL., U.S. DEp'T OF JUSTICE, Doc. No. 107,746, PERIODIC URINE TESTING AS A 
SIGNALING DEVICE FOR PRETRIAL RELEASE RISK 24 (May 1988). 
7. National Drug Control Strategy, 25 WEEKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 1308, 1309 
(Sept. 5, 1989). Also, the United States allocated nearly ten billion dollars in 1990 
alone towards battling the drug problem. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG 
CONTROL STRATEGY 7 (Jan. 1990). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Typically, an arrest is made before anyone ever faces a 
criminal prosecution. Once within the criminal justice system 
the arrestee experiences a certain degree of tension between 
his or her liberty interests and at least two institutional re-
quirements of many court systems in the United States: (1) se-
curing the return of the arrestee for trial; and (2) insuring that 
the arrestee's behavior on release does not pose a threat to the 
community. Occasionally, these governmental interests are 
adequately served only by pretrial detention.8 In United States 
v. Salerno,9 Chief Justice Rehnquist cautioned that: "In our 
society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or with-
out trial is the carefully limited exception."10 Accordingly, 
arrestees are free of guilt until a conviction is secured, but 
there is not an absolute right to bailY 
Conditions and procedures for setting bail are established 
by federal and state statutes. Traditionally, arrestee flight 
before trial was the principal concern in judicial pre-trial re-
lease determinations. During the late-1960's, however, commu-
nities became increasingly anxious over risks posed by accused 
criminals who committed further crimes while released on 
bail. 12 Consequently, at least thirty-two states, the District of 
Columbia, and the federal government passed laws establishing 
public safety as an additional factor to be considered by a judge 
when setting bail or establishing other pretrial release condi-
tions. 13 In Salerno, the Supreme Court validated the behavior-
al factor by holding that the prevention of public danger to the 
community can outweigh an arrestee's interest in liberty. 14 
In attempting to predict either type of pretrial misconduct, 
8. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 523, 523 (1979). 
9. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
10. ld. at 755. 
11. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754-55 (1987) (holding that the 
eighth amendment grants no absolute right to bail); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 
524, 541-42, 544-46 (1952) (holding that when aliens are dangerous, their detention 
pending a deportation hearing does not violate the eighth amendment); Stack v. 
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (holding that bail is a conditional right). 
12. BARBARA GoTTLIEB, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PuBLIC DANGER AS A FACTOR IN 
PRETRIAL RELEASE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE LAWS 1, 17-20 (July 1985); 
see also John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail 
Reform, 76 J. CRJM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 56-64 (1985). 
13. See GoTTLIEB, supra note 12, at 17-20. 
14. 481 U.S. at 748. 
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judges must somehow fill the information vacuum relating to 
each arrestee in order to establish pretrial release conditions. 
Typically, judges assess the risks posed by arrestees while on 
pretrial release by weighing a variety of factors, such as, the 
nature of the charge, the arrestees employment status, family 
and community ties, or past criminal activities. However, pre-
dictions based upon these criteria are largely subjective and 
could lead to inconsistent results. 15 The D.C. bail statute, sim-
ilar to the statutes of many other jurisdictions, allows judges to 
base pretrial release on financial or nonfinancial conditions. 
Nonfinancial conditions include release by restricting travel, 
association, place of abode, or by requiring the arrestee to 
maintain employment, to stay off drugs, or to abide by "any 
other condition".16 
Quite often judges have incomplete and unconfirmed infor-
mation about arrestees when they are arraigned. In attempting 
to substantiate information, most major cities now have neutral 
fact-finders, or pretrial services agencies, which assist the 
judge in making pretrial release decisions. The D.C. Pretrial 
Services Agency performs typical pretrial information gathering 
by: (1) interviewing all arrestees to gather factual matter rele-
vant to pretrial release; (2) taking the gathered data and sub-
mitting release recommendations to the court; and (3) monitor-
ing compliance with whatever conditions are actually imposed 
by the court. 17 
For several years, the Department of Justice has actively 
promoted greater use of pre-arraignment drug testing as a 
means of gathering release relevant information. In order to 
determine the viability of the concept, the Justice Department 
funded a pilot program in Washington, D.C. in 1984. After the 
program's successful implementation, it was implemented in 
the federal pretrial system. The department funded similar 
programs in three additional jurisdictions in late 198718 and 
added another three in 1988.19 Currently, federal funds are 
15. See James K. Stewart, Quid Pro Quo: Stay Drug-Free and Stay on Release, 
57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 73 (1988). 
16. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321(a) (1981). 
17. MARY A. TOBERG ET AL, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ASSESSMENT OF PRETRIAL 
URINE TESTING IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA vi (Dec. 1989). 
18. The new sites were Portland, Oregon; Tucson, Arizona; and Wilmington 
County, Delaware. 
19. These additional sites were Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Phoenix, Arizona; and 
Prince Georges County, Maryland. The last six programs established were funded 
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used in the operation of five arrestee drug testing programs.20 
The federal government has substantiated the relevance of 
drug testing to release decision making by exploring the drug-
crime connection through various studies. For example, the 
Department of Justice has screened thousands of anonymous 
arrestees for illegal drug use through its Drug Use Forecasting 
program.21 Alarmingly, the research shows that in every par-
ticipating city the majority of all arrestees use drugs. In some 
cities well over three-quarters of all arrestees test positive for 
drugs. 22 More recently, a survey of jail inmates conducted by 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics reveals a clear connection be-
tween the use of illegal drugs and the incidence of theft and 
violent crime. 23 The study found that one in three convicted 
robbers and burglars admitted that the need to buy drugs was 
a motive behind their crime, one in four violent offenders and 
one-third of those convicted of property crimes were on drugs 
when committing their crimes, four in ten convicts had used 
drugs during the month before their offense, and nearly one-
third of offenders had been using illegal drugs every day during 
the month before their crime.24 
Ill. THE CURRENT USE OF PRETRIAL DRUG TESTING 
Although some differences exist, the operation of the test-
pursuant to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4309 
(1988). 
20. All of the drug testing programs established through the Justice Depart-
ment funding are still in operation, with the exception of the Wilmington, Dela-
ware program. The Washington, D.C. program is now operated with local funding. 
For specific details on the status of these programs see Cynthia Durrant Jensen, 
Comment, Survey of Current and Prior Pretrial Drug Testing Sites, 5 B.Y.U. J. 
PUB. L. ??? (1991). 
21. The Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) program tested 300 to 400 arrestees de-
tained in jails in 21 cities for drug use four times a year to detect the level of 
drug use in the criminal population. In contrast to the pre-arraignment testing, the 
tests are done anonymously, with no results being reported to the court. See NA-
TIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPI'. OF JUSTICE, DRUG USE FORECASTING PRO-
GRAM: FIRST QUARTER, 1989 (1989). 
22. Id. The percentage of male arrestees testing positive for drugs was over 
75% for 8 of the 12 cities. Chicago and San Diego lead the nation with arrestee 
use rates over 80%. Id. Every city in the survey, but Phoenix, showed drug use 
rates of over 60%. Id. 
23. Inmate Study Links Crime, Drug Habits, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1991, at A13. 
The findings were based on 5,675 questionnaires returned by inmates of local jails. 
Jail Inmate Survey Links Drugs and Crime, U.S. Newswire, Aug. 23, 1991, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, U.S. Newswire File [hereinafter Survey]. 
24. Survey, supra note 2a. 
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ing programs are generally modeled after the D.C. testing pro-
gram. This program has two principal goals. The first is to 
provide bail-setting judges with a less subjective method to 
determine recent drug use by defendants. The second is to 
provide the court with a simple and effective new release condi-
tion that can reduce both the risk of failure to appear and pre-
trial criminal activity.25 
The drug testing process begins soon after the arrestees 
are brought to the courthouse lock-up. While awaiting a pretri-
al release hearing, every arrestee is informed about the drug 
testing procedure and for what purpose the results will be 
used. Then the arrestee is asked by a pretrial services worker 
to voluntarily submit a urine sample for drug testing.26 If the 
arrestee refuses to submit a sample, that refusal is recorded 
and reported to the bail-setting judge who usually will order 
the defendant to take a urine test as a basis of any nonfinan-
cial release. 
In order to ensure the integrity of the sample,27 the ar-
restee urinates in full view of a pretrial services worker and 
often in the incidental view of four or five other inmates await-
ing their turn. The urine is hand-delivered to a lab housed in 
the building and immediately tested for the presence of various 
specific illicit drugs.28 Urine samples are screened using the 
25. TOBERG, supra note 17, at 1. 
26. The pretrial services worker is required to give the following warning before 
collecting any sample: 
My name is __ and I work for the Pretrial Services Agency. I am 
here to collect a urine sample from you. That sample will be tested and 
the results will be ready for court. The results will be used only to make 
a release recommendation and cannot be used against you in your case. 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCY, PRETRIAL SERVICES TRAINING 
MANUAL 125 (1989) [hereinafter MANUAL). 
27. John A. Carver, Esq., Director of the D.C. pretrial services, observed that 
nearly every day a defendant attempts to tamper with the procedures through such 
devices as attaching some apparatus to the body, using a proxy, or through brib-
ery. United States v. Centurino, No. 87-0043-14-LFO, 1987 WL 12486, at *2, *3 
(D.D.C. May 21, 1987) (letter appended to the order of the district court). In order 
to establish chain of custody, the pretrial services worker verifies the name of the 
arrestee by checking the defendants wristband, gives the defendant a cup to fill, 
then when the sample is returned, the worker verifies the testee's identity by 
checking the wristband. Next, the arrestee inspects the label for correctness, after 
which he or she attaches it to the sample. The worker then checks off the 
arrestee's name on the lock-up list. During this process a worker maintains a clear 
view of the cellblock urinal although the established procedures do not require 
actual observation of the genital area. See generally id. at 125. 
28. The arrestees' urine is tested for the presence of opiates, cocaine, PCP, 
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enzyme-multiplied immunoassay test (EMIT).29 Samples that 
test drug-positive are retested. The test results are reported to 
the judge at or before the arraignment of the arrestee. To keep 
the test results out of the public record, the result is verbally 
reported to the judge by the pretrial services representative in 
the courtroom. Test results are required by law to be used 
solely for setting conditions of release and are kept confidential 
by the court. 30 
Generally, arrestees testing positive for drug use are re-
quired, as a condition of release, to report to the pretrial servic-
es agency for subsequent drug testing or to a drug treatment 
program. Failure to report for urinalysis or to abstain from 
drug use is grounds for temporary or permanent revocation of 
pretrial release under the contempt power of the court.31 
Results of the testing program in Washington, D.C. show 
that it is accomplishing its goals. The experience of the District 
of Columbia shows that urine testing leads to greater predict-
ability of pretrial misconduct by making a "consistent, signifi-
cant, incremental contribution to pretrial risk classification" 
above that achieved through weighing traditional factors, such 
as, community ties, past criminal record, and the like.32 Drug 
testing also provides an alternative release mechanism for 
those who might otherwise remain in jail because they are 
unable to raise funds for bail.33 
Judges in the District of Columbia are responding favor-
ably to the information gained through pre-arraignment drug 
testing. The vast majority of judges place significant reliance 
on the drug test information as one of the factors used in mak-
amphetamines, and methadone. 
29. The Syva Company, maker of the enzyme-multiplied immunoassay test 
(EMIT), claims that the test is 95% accurate while others argue the EMIT's 
reliability may be as low as 82%. Rosen, supra note 3, at 1167 n.26 and accom-
panying text. 
30. The PSA enabling legislation requires that "[a]ny information contained in 
the agency's files, presented in its report, or divulged during the course of the 
hearing shall not be admissible on the issue of guilt in any judicial proceeding." 
D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1303(d) (1981). The PSA interprets this provision as proscrib-
ing them from using pretrial urine tests on the issue of guilt or innocence in any 
subsequent proceeding. TOBEHG, supra note 17, at 2. Release of test information is 
strictly regulated and under no condition is the confidential information released to 
families of defendants, victims, third party custodians, the media, or the police. ld.; 
see generally MANUAL, supra note 26, at 129-30. 
31. TOBERG, supra note 17, at 1-2. 
32. TOBERG, supra note 17, at 10-11. 
33. Abell, supra note 3, at 956. 
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ing release decisions.34 In addition, judges tend to feel more 
comfortable releasing drug-related offenders before trial.35 
Moreover, a majority of judges surveyed in the District of Co-
lumbia felt that the pretrial drug testing program is responsi-
ble for a reduction in pretrial criminality and failures to ap-
pear.36 
IV. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n 
AND National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab 
Although the courts have rendered many decisions concern-
ing drug testing under varied circumstances, only in Berry v. 
District of Columbia,37 has any significant constitutional chal-
lenge to the pretrial drug testing procedure been presented 
before a federal circuit court of appeals. The Berry court, how-
ever, never decided the constitutional issues raised by pretrial 
drug testing but remanded those issues back to the district 
court where the case was eventually dismissed for failure to 
prosecute.38 However, the Supreme Court in Skinner and Von 
Raab has established the analysis by which Fourth Amend-
ment challenges to government drug testing programs are 
assessed. 
A. The Skinner Facts 
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association,39 
railway labor unions brought suit in federal district court to 
enjoin the enforcement of regulations promulgated by the Fed-
34. Mary A. Toberg & John P. Bellassai, Pretrial Urine-Testing in the District 
of Columbia: The Perspectives of Judicial Officers, 22-23 (August 1989) (draft, on 
file with author) [hereinafter Judicial Perspectives]. 
35. Visher, supra note 6, at 19. 
36. Judicial Perspectives, supra note 34, at 19. 
37. 833 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
38. 107 F.R.D. 663 (D.D.C. 1987); see also Abney V. District of Columbia, Civ. 
No. 87-2339 SSH, 1989 WL 17750 (D.D.C. 1989) (dismissing case challenging pre-
arraignment drug testing, in part, because some parties and issues overlapped the 
Berry case). The court of appeals held that the compulsory urinalysis involved in 
post-release testing program was a Fourth Amendment search, requiring a showing 
of reasonableness in order to pass constitutional muster. Berry, 833 F.2d at 1034-
36. Finding the record barren of factual findings relating to the testing program 
and its operation, the court of appeals remanded the case back to the district court 
to make such factual findings. !d. Since the defendant did not submit a urine 
sample before his arraignment, the court refused to consider the issue of the 
constitutionality of the pre-arraignment testing portion of the program. !d. 
39. 489 u.s. 602 (1989). 
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eral Railroad Administration (FRA) aimed at determining the 
involvement of drugs or alcohol in specific types of train acci-
dents.40 Under the regulations, the immediate chemical test-
ing of blood and urine specimens for the presence of alcohol 
and illicit drugs is mandated for all railroad employees in-
volved in a serious train accident.41 In addition, the regula-
tions authorize testing of any employee who a supervisor rea-
sonably suspects is under the influence of drugs or alcohol.42 
The railroad transports each employee to be tested to an inde-
pendent medical facility where each gives both a blood and 
urine sample.43 The employees are required to fill out a form 
disclosing any medications they may have taken in the past 
thirty days. This information is used to help explain any false-
positive test results.44 Each employee is indirectly monitored 
as the urine sample is given, although direct observation is a 
more effective means of ensuring sample integrity.45 The sam-
ples are then sent to an FRA laboratory for analysis. Samples 
testing positive are then confirmed through retesting.46 Em-
ployees refusing to take the test cannot work at their present 
positions for nine months though they are entitled to a hearing 
related to that refusal.47 The FRA regulations require that 
employees are notified of test results and allowed an opportu-
nity to make a written response to those findings. 48 While the 
drug test information is not sought for prosecutorial purposes, 
the FRA regulations do not forbid the use of test results as 
evidence in any criminal prosecution.49 
The district court granted summary judgment for the rail-
road and refused to enjoin the FRA from enforcing the new 
regulations. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the district court judgement. 5° While the circuit court 
40. 49 C.F.R. §§ 219.101 to 219.307 (1989). 
41. 49 C.F.R. § 219.201 (1989). 
42. 49 C.F.R. § 219.301 (1989). 
43. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 609. 
44. ld. at 610. 
45. ld. 
46. ld. at 609-10. 
47. ld. at 610-11. 
48. ld. at 610. 
49. ld. at 621 n.5. The Supreme Court approved of the testing program in 
Skinner, even though 49 C.F.R. § 219.21l(d) (1987) provided that the test results 
could be used in criminal prosecution. The Court opined that the testing program 
was intended for an administrative purpose and, consequently, was not intended as 
a "pretext" to aid in criminal prosecutions. ld. 
50. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988), 
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waived the warrant and probable cause requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment, it concluded that the tests were unreason-
able because requiring a particularized suspicion did not im-
pose an overly burdensome duty on the railroad.51 The Su-
preme Court reversed. 52 
B. The Von Raab Facts 
In 1985, The Customs Service, while not believing it had a 
drug problem within its ranks, instituted a mass drug testing 
program among employees seeking certain categories of em-
ployment. 53 Testing is mandatory for all applicants seeking 
positions having direct involvement in the "drug war", requir-
ing the employee to carry a firearm, or involving access to clas-
sified material desirable to drug smugglers.54 
Under the program employees are given five-days notice of 
their testing date.55 All arrangements for the drug test are 
made through an independent contractor.56 To ensure integri-
ty of the sample, the test procedures include: requiring photo 
identification, removal of outer garments and personal belong-
ings, placing dye in the toilet water, checking the sample for 
proper color and temperature, and placing the urine sample in 
a tamper proof container and a sealed plastic bag before send-
ing it to a laboratory. 57 While the presence of a same sex mon-
itor is required, the employee may urinate behind a partition or 
in a bathroom stall. 58 The current regulations do not require 
the employee to disclose any personal medical information 
unless the specimen test is drug-positive.59 The samples are 
tested initially with the EMIT technique and drug-positive 
results are then confirmed using highly sophisticated gas 
chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS).60 The test re-
rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
51. ld. at 588. 
52. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
53. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660 (1989). 
54. ld. at 660-61. 
55. Id. at 664. 
56. ld. at 661. 
57. ld. 
58. ld. 
59. ld. at 661 n.l. 
60. ld. at 662. Gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) is slightly more 
accurate than EMIT but can cost from $70 to $100 to perform while EMIT runs as 
little as $5. Rosen, supra note 3, at 1162 n.9 and accompanying text, 1167-68 nn. 
26-31 and accompanying text. 
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suits are kept confidential by the Customs Service and may not 
be used for criminal prosecution without the employee's written 
consent.61 
The National Treasury Employees Union was granted an 
injunction by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana halting the Customs Service's drug testing program 
holding that it violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.62 On appeal, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the injunc-
tion and held the program was constitutional.63 The circuit 
court found that the Customs Service's interest in deterring 
drug use among its employees outweighed the limited intrusion 
into their privacy. 64 The Supreme Court upheld the appellate 
court's decision with regard to workers who were either directly 
involved in the drug interdiction effort or who carried a fire-
arm; but, the Court held that the record was too barren to 
determine the reasonability of applying the program to workers 
with access to classified materials. 65 
C. The Court's Analysis in Skinner and Von Raab 
1. Urinalysis Constitutes a Fourth Amendment Search 
Prior to Skinner and Von Raab, the lower courts were in-
consistent on a number of issues relating to drug testing. Con-
fusion existed concerning such matters as the necessity of re-
quiring particularized suspicion,66 the strength of the required 
nexus between the government objective and the means of 
furthering that objective,67 the relevance of least restrictive 
alternatives,68 the type of evidence required on which to base 
conclusions that a drug problem exists, and the kind of proof 
needed to support a connection between the problem and the 
means of addressing it. 69 The Skinner and Von Raab Courts 
61. !d. at 663. 
62. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. 
La. 1986). 
63. National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 
1987). 
64. !d. at 177-78. 
65. National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677-78 
(1989). 
66. Carver, supra note 6, at 343-44; Westover, supra note 3, at 809 n.141. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
Rosen, supra note 3,at 1231-32. 
Rosen, supra note 3, at 1232-33. 
Rosen. supra note 3, at 1234-36. 
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cast light on how issues related to mandatory and suspicionless 
drug testing must be resolved under the Fourth Amendment. 
In accordance with lower court decisions,70 the Supreme 
Court held for the first time that urinalysis compelled by the 
government constitutes a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment.71 Traditionally, only those tests which necessitated an 
actual physical intrusion, such as a blood test, were afforded 
Fourth Amendment protection.72 Justice Kennedy, writing for 
the majority, quoted the Fifth Circuit: 
"There are few activities in our society more personal or pri-
vate than the passing of urine. Most people describe it by 
euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a function tradi-
tionally performed without public observation; indeed, its 
performance in public is generally prohibited by law as well 
as social custom.'173 
The Court held that a urinalysis is a search 74 under the 
Fourth Amendment because it implicates expectations of priva-
cy in both the act of urination and in the subsequent chemical 
analysis of the urine specimen which could reveal highly per-
sonal information about the testee. 75 
70. On the circuit court level see Lovvorn v. City of Chatanooga, 846 F.2d 
1539, 1542 (6th Cir. 1988); R.L.E.A. v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 580 (9th Cir. 1988), 
rev'd, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); N.F.F.E. v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 942 (D.C. Cir. 
1987); Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated sub nom. 
Jenkins v. Jones, 490 U.S. 1001 (1989); Berry v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 
1031, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 1986); 
and Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976). At the district court level see Feliciano v. 
City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 586 (N.D. Ohio 1987); American Fed'n of 
Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986); Capua v. City of 
Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986); and McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. 
Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985). 
71. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-17. 
72. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966) (holding that 
a blood test is a search because it intrudes into the skin and subsequent chemical 
analysis reveals private information). 
73. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. 
Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987)). 
74. The Court noted that blood or urine testing could constitute a seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment because of one's possessory interest in his or her 
bodily fluids, Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 n.4 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 
U.S. 109, 113 (1984)), but the Court determined that protections afforded expecta-
tions of privacy adequately protected any property interest in bodily fluids. Id. 
75. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (explaining that chemical analysis can reveal per-
sonal conditions, such as, pregnancy, epilepsy, or diabetes). 
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2. Drug Tests Are Reasonable Under the "Special Needs" 
Analysis 
421 
a. The presence of "special needs". The Constitution 
requires all searches to be reasonable. In Skinner and Von 
Raab the court reemphasized that "reasonableness" generally 
requires that searches be carried out pursuant to a warrant 
based on probable cause. 76 Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy 
stated that it is a "longstanding principle that neither a war-
rant nor probable cause, nor ... any measure of individualized 
suspicion, is an indispensable component of reasonableness in 
every circumstance."77 One such circumstance is where the 
search furthers a "special need" of the government in a non-law 
enforcement situation in which the warrant and probable cause 
requirements are impractical. 78 In Skinner the government 
had a special need in maintaining the safe operation of the rail-
roads.79 Similarly, in Von Raab the Court held that the Cus-
toms Service had a special need in maintaining the integrity of 
the borders and in ensuring public safety.80 
b. Drug tests reasonable absent a warrant. The Court 
noted that an essential purpose behind the warrant require-
ment is to assure citizens that they are not being subjected to 
arbitrary or random government acts.81 A government search 
under a warrant informs citizens that the search is lawful and 
narrowly tailored in purpose and scope.82 The Court found 
that in both Skinner and Von Raab the purposes of a warrant 
were otherwise served due to such factors as: only specific cir-
cumstances triggered the imposition of the drug tests; the in-
trusion was limited by specific and narrow definition in the 
regulations; moreover, the regulations put employees on notice 
as to the procedures; and only minimal discretion existed over im-
posing the drug tests on employees.83 
Heightening the need to dispense with the warrant re-
quirement was the Court's finding that requiring the govern-
ment to procure warrants was likely to frustrate the legitimate 
76. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665. 
77. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618-24). 
78. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66. 
79. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618-21. 
80. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666-67. 
81. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621-22; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667. 
82. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622. 
83. ld.; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667. 
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government purposes in administering the tests. In Skinner the 
Court held that since government activity had been adequately 
circumscribed, it was unreasonable to require the railroad to 
obtain warrants when such a duty would significantly hinder 
the purposes of the testing program.84 Likewise, the Von Raab 
Court found that the delay and expense in seeking search war-
rants for routine employment matters unduly diverted the 
resources of the Customs Service away from its most pressing 
responsibilities of drug interdiction and maintaining the bor-
ders.85 
c. Special needs outweigh individual privacy 
interests. Even after finding a warrant contextually unneces-
sary, the Court stressed that probable cause is generally re-
quired though it is peculiarly germane to criminal investiga-
tions.86 The Court looked to a variety of factors relating to pri-
vacy interests and the special needs of the government before 
concluding that the pertinent drug tests were justified. 
(1) The government's interests. Mter balancing the 
interests, a search may require no suspicion where the 
government's special need relates to the discovery of unseen 
conditions or to deter the development of such conditions87 
where the special need for the intrusion would be jeopardized 
by requiring any particularized suspicion.88 For instance, in 
Von Raab the Court found that the potential drug-related 
harms of impairing the judgment and integrity of Customs 
Service employees' was a substantial problem outweighing the 
implicated privacy interests despite any evidence of an existing 
problem.89 The Skinner Court noted that because great 
human loss may result from drug or alcohol impairment before 
any visible signs may emerge, testing without individualized suspi-
cion is a compelling state interest.90 In addition, the Court 
held that particularized suspicion may be dispensed with where 
it is a serious impediment to gaining valuable information 
about the cause of train accidents.91 
(2) Privacy interests. While recognizing the gravity 
84. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624. 
85. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666-67. 
86. !d. at 667-68. 
87. !d. at 668. 
88. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624; see Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668. 
89. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674-75. 
90. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628. 
91. !d. at 631. 
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of the individual privacy interest involved in mandatory and 
suspicionless drug testing, the Court focused its attention on 
factors leading to the conclusion that the government intrusion 
was minimal. The Court noted government efforts to minimize 
the intrusion into the employees' privacy. For example, the 
urine testing was made less intrusive because neither the FRA 
nor Customs Service regulations required direct visual moni-
toring of urination, and the testing took place in a medical 
setting by independent contractors.92 Moreover, employees 
would not be required to reveal in advance any medications 
they were taking and the sample could only be tested for the 
presence of specified illicit drugs. 93 Further minimizing the 
impact of the tests were the stringent restrictions placed on the 
use of the medical information obtained through the testing. 94 
In addition, the Court found that the test results were not 
gathered to be used in any criminal prosecution but rather to 
further a non-law enforcement goal of the government.95 
Another impetus behind the Court's finding of minimal 
intrusion on privacy was the recognition that the context of the 
drug testing program lessened the impact of the intrusion.96 
The Court noted that certain employees in the public sector 
and in highly regulated industries have a reduced expectation 
of privacy because they are subject to notice that safety, health 
and fitness are important aspects of their jobs.97 In addition, 
employee privacy expectations in the railroad industry are 
further diminished because railway personnel have been a 
primary focus of regulatory concern in the industry.98 In Von 
Raab, carrying firearms by Customs Service employees reduced 
their expectations of privacy relating to inquiries into personal 
fitness. 99 Moreover, employees involved in drug interdiction 
should reasonably expect scrutiny into their probity and fit-
ness.100 
Ultimately the Court determined the impracticality of a 
warrant or particularized suspicion by finding that the purpos-
92. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626-27; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 661. 
93. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621 n.5; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 661 n.l. 
94. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 663. 
95. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621 n.5; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 663. 
96. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671. 
97. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627. 
98. ld. at 628. 
99. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672. 
100. ld 
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es behind a warrant were otherwise served and that the 
government's special need in performing the pertinent searches 
outweighed any intrusions on relevant privacy expecta-
tions.101 By a seven to two majority, the Skinner Court deter-
mined that the government's special need in maintaining the 
safe operation of the railroads outweighed the individual priva-
cy interests of railroad workers. 102 Similarly, the Von Raab 
Court, by a five to four majority, found the government's spe-
cial need in maintaining the integrity of the borders and in 
ensuring public safety was more significant than the privacy 
interests of job applicants. In reaching its conclusions in Skin-
ner and Von Raab, the Court did not find any one factor to be 
dispositive, 103 but rather, held the aggregate weight of inter-
ests to be in favor of the government. 
3. The Dissents 
The majority positions in both Skinner and Von Raab were 
harshly criticized by the dissenting justices. Dissenting in Skin-
ner, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, declared 
"[t]he majority's acceptance of dragnet blood and urine testing 
ensures that the first, and worst, casualty of the war on drugs 
will be the precious liberties of our citizens."104 The dissent 
posited that the majority impermissibly expanded the "special 
needs" exception so that it entirely excuses the probable cause 
requirement in civil contexts. 105 Moreover, Marshall charged 
the majority with creating a dangerous and malleable balanc-
ing test whose only justification is the policy results it per-
101. The Supreme Court has found a special need exception under each search 
object covered in the express language of the Fourth Amendment, i.e., persons, 
houses, papers, and effects. See e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620 (persons); Von Raab, 
489 U.S. at 668 (persons); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987) (hous-
es) (holding that a warrantless search of probationer's home based on "reasonable 
grounds" did not violate the Fourth Amendment since the state has special needs 
in probation supervision); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26 (1987) (papers) 
(holding that a warrantless search of government employee's office did not violate 
Fourth Amendment because the federal government has special needs in the 
employee context); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (effects) (holding 
that a warrantless search of student's purse based on "reasonable suspicion" did 
not violate Fourth Amendment because of special need of schools to respond 
immediately to disruptive behavior). 
· 102. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618-21. 
103. See Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185, 1190 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
112 S. Ct. 669 (1991). 
104. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 635-36 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
105. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 640. 
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mits. 106 
Aside from Marshall and Brennan reiterating their Skinner 
dissent, Von Raab drew a dissenting opinion from Justice 
Scalia. For Justice Scalia, the probability of an existing prob-
lem to be addressed is a significant factor in the overall special 
needs equation. While supporting the majority in the Skinner 
decision, he criticized the Von Raab majority for allowing drug 
testing where no record of a concrete drug problem could be 
shown. 107 Scalia argued that government intrusions implicat-
ed in drug testing cannot be justified simply by their symbolic 
nature, but rather, the government must show the existence of 
a problem to be remedied before mandatory and suspicionless 
drug testing can be sanctioned. 108 
V. PRE-ARRAIGNMENT DRUG TESTING UNDER THE 
SPECIAL NEEDS ANALYSIS 
After Skinner, Von Raab and their progeny/09 
suspicionless and mandatory urine testing of arrestees consti-
tutes a search deserving some measure of Fourth Amendment 
protection. While Fourth Amendment rights are rarely shaped 
through mechanical tests, 110 the Skinner and Von Raab 
Courts greatly relaxed the analysis for government drug testing 
programs under its "reasonableness"111 or "balancing" 
inquiry.112 Indeed government drug testing programs are not 
106. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 640-41. 
107. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680, 686-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
108. Id. at 686-87. 
109. See, e.g., Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 
S. Ct. 669 (1991); Hartness v. Bush, 919 F.2d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
111 S. Ct. 2890 (1991); National Treasury Employees Union v. Yeutter, 918 F.2d 
968 (D.C. Cir. 1990); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884 
(D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1960 (1990); Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 
1188 (lOth Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059 (1990); Harmon v. Thornburgh, 
878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990); National Fed'n of 
Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 
1056 (1990); Thomson v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1989). 
110. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that specific content and 
incident's Fourth Amendment rights are shaped by the contexts in which they are 
asserted). 
111. Unreasonable searches are those infringing on privacy expectations that 
"society is prepared to accept as reasonable." See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616; see also 
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). The current test is primarily 
objective as opposed to the Katz two part test which focused on both subjective 
and objective expectations of privacy. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
112. The circuit court opinions in Skinner and Von Raab used tests different 
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likely to receive any greater scrutiny than some form of ratio-
nal basis review. As one commentator noted, the new standard 
is based on "practicality and efficiency." 113 
As a preliminary matter, some question may arise as to the 
application of the Court's rationale in Skinner and Von Raab to 
the somewhat different context of pre-arraignment drug testing 
in the District of Columbia. The Supreme Court's use of "spe-
cial needs" precedents shows that the special needs rationale 
applies in varying contexts so long as the search is being imple-
mented pursuant to a government regulatory endeavor. For 
instance, in Griffin v. Wisconsin/ 14 a case involving the 
government's special need to perform a warrantless search of a 
probationer's home, the Court incorporated into its own analy-
sis the rationales from such contexts as the operation of pris-
ons, schools, government offices, and highly regulated in-
dustries.115 Consistent with Griffin, the Skinner and Von 
Raab Courts relied on special needs precedents outside the em-
ployment context. 116 Consequently, the Skinner and Von 
Raab rationale governs drug testing in the pre-arraignment 
context. 
While contextual differences between the special needs 
cases exist, the contextual focus of Skinner and Von Raab 
makes application of precedent relating to other government 
drug testing programs a matter of comparison and contrast in 
the overall balancing endeavor. Indeed, the privacy interests 
implicated in pre-arraignment drug testing do not appear as 
from each other as well as from the Court's present test. Von Raab used the Bell 
v. Wolfish test which requires consideration of (1) the scope of the government 
intrusion; (2) the manner in which it is carried out; (3) the government's justifica-
tion for initiating it; and (4) the place where the search is conducted. Bell v. Wolf-
ish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). The Skinner Court used another prominent test, 
derived from Terry v. Ohio, requiring that (1) the government imposition be justi-
fied at its inception, and (2) the scope of the intrusion itself must be reasonably 
related to the conditions which justified the initial government action. Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968). While these tests are still useful as analytical 
organizational tools, they are much more complicated than the Court's simple 
lining up of the competing interests. 
113. Lois Yurow, Comment, Alternative Challenges to Drug Testing of Govern-
ment Employees: Options after Von Raab and Skinner, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 148 
(1989); see also Mass, supra note 3, at 244-45. 
114. 483 u.s. 868 (1987). 
115. [d. at 873-74. 
116. See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-21, 630 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 
520 (1979) (body cavity searches of prisoners)); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 
(1987) (search of probationer's home). 
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substantial as those implicated in the employment context. For 
example, employees who are subjected to urine testing face pos-
sible disciplinary proceedings including discharge. However, 
arrestees who participate in the drug testing program may be 
released where they otherwise would not be due to judges re-
quiring drug test monitoring during release instead of de facto 
detention through imposition of unpayable financially based 
release conditions. 117 
A. A "Special Need" in a Non-Law Enforcement Context 
Prior to balancing the "special needs" of the government 
against the privacy interests of arrestees, several factors must 
be established in relation to the District of Colombia testing 
program. First, does the District of Columbia have a special 
need in the operation of its drug testing program? Second, is 
the warrant requirement redundant or unhelpful under the 
circumstances? Third, does requiring a warrant or probable 
cause frustrate the legitimate government purposes in per-
forming the search? 
The District of Columbia has a special need in operating 
its pre-arraignment testing program because it furthers the 
government's compelling interest in the regulation of its bail 
system. In Salerno, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the "legiti-
mate" regulatory function of pretrial detention and the "compel-
ling" governmental interest in preventing criminal activity by 
arrestees while on pretrial release. 118 Regulation of the bail 
system and public safety are behind the purposes of pre-ar-
raignment drug testing. 119 Without mandatory and 
suspicionless drug testing, the District of Columbia would be 
deprived of an effective aspect of its bailment system. While a 
special need might not require a compelling state interest, the 
presence of such an interest presents a special need that may 
justify a warrantless and suspicionless search. 
As mentioned in Skinner and Von Raab, the purpose be-
hind the warrant requirement is to assure citizens that the 
government is not acting arbitrarily. In accordance with Skin-
ner and Von Raab, pre-arraignment drug testing may be ac-
117. Abell, supra note 3, at 956. 
118. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747, 749 (1987); see also Schall v. 
Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264-65 (1984); De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155 
(1960). 
119. TOBERG, supra note 17, at 1. 
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complished without a warrant if perceptions of arbitrariness 
are avoided through procedures and circumstances which as-
sure arrestees that the tests are lawful and narrowly tailored 
in purpose and scope. Several aspects of the drug testing pro-
gram serve the purposes behind the warrant requirement. For 
instance, pre-arraignment testing takes place according to 
detailed instructions contained in the Pretrial Services Train-
ing Manual. Before arrestees are tested, they are informed of 
the test procedure, the limited use of the information in release 
hearings, and that the information cannot be used against 
them. Also, since all arrestees are tested, pretrial services' 
workers exercise no discretion as to who is tested. Aside from 
what the government has done to give notice of the search, 
arrestees should be on notice that certain administrative proce-
dures will be required of them during the course of any ar-
rest.120 
Frustration of purpose is another aspect of the special 
needs analysis that will increase the likelihood that a warrant 
or probable cause will not be required in arrestee drug testing. 
In the District of Columbia, if an arrestee refuses to give a 
sample, judges routinely order him or her to submit to a drug 
test even without probable cause. However, requiring such a 
judicial presentment would hinder the orderly processing of 
arrestees without an appreciable benefit to individual privacy, 
especially where the court will order a drug test anyway. 
Probable cause is also unhelpful in determining the reason-
ableness of pre-arraignment drug testing. For example, a fun-
damental purpose in testing all arrestees is to find those indi-
viduals who show no outward signs of drug use at the time of 
arrest. Moreover, the class of test subjects cannot be narrowed 
by looking to a specific category of offenses because congres-
sional and empirical findings indicate that the connection be-
tween drugs and crime is not limited to specific types of crimes 
but can be related to nearly any property or violent crime. 121 
To require a warrant or probable cause in the pre-arraignment 
drug testing context is irrelevant because "there are virtually 
120. See United States v. Anderson, 490 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that 
arrestees may be required to appear in a lineup in connection with an unrelated 
offense). 
121. Brief and Appendix for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16, 36, 
Berry v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In 1988 Congress 
found a "well proven" connection between drugs and crime. Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 
Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5251(a)(13), 102 Stat. 4309, 4309-10 (198R). 
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no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate."122 
B. Balancing the Interests 
Even if a warrant is not required in the context of pre-
arraignment drug testing, the probable cause requirement 
presumptively applies though it is strongest in the context of 
criminal investigations. The requirements of probable cause, or 
any particularized suspicion, stands or falls as the result of the 
special needs balancing inquiry where the Court "substitute[s] 
its balancing of interests for that of the Framers."123 In order 
for pre-arraignment drug testing to be constitutional, the 
government's interest which is the basis of the intrusion must 
outweigh the individual's interest in not allowing the drug 
tests. 
1. Pretrial services' interest in performing the tests 
Turning to the government side of the ad hoc Skinner I Von 
Raab balancing test, factors relevant to the constitutionality of 
arrestee drug testing can be grouped into four categories: (1) 
the nature of the government's interest; (2) the "operational 
realities" of the government endeavor; (3) a least restrictive 
means analysis; and (4) the strength of the end-means nexus. 
All of these categories support the proposition that pre-arraign-
ment drug testing withstands Fourth Amendment scrutiny. 
a. The nature of the government's interest. Under Skin-
ner and Von Raab, a search might not require any particular-
ized suspicion where the government's special need relates to 
discovering or preventing the development of hidden conditions, 
or where requiring particularized suspicion would jeopardize 
the search arising from the special need. 
As in Skinner and Von Raab, pretrial services is attempt-
ing to discover a drug use condition in testees which is not 
readily apparent to natural observation. The District of Colum-
bia has a compelling government interest in ensuring arrestee 
reappearance at trial and in protecting the public from further 
criminal activity by those on pretrial release. Since empirical 
evidence supports the validity of drug use as an indicator of 
pretrial misconduct, taking away its use will directly impact 
the public safety. 
122. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622. 
123. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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b. The "operational realities" of information 
gathering. The "operational realities" of gathering pretrial 
release information fro_m the numerous arrestees passing 
through the courthouse lock-up may also play a part in deter-
mining the practicality of the warrant or individualized suspi-
cion. The Court in Von Raab noted that, in order for the gov-
ernment to operate its offices, common-sense dictates that 
every work-related intrusion cannot become a matter of consti-
tutional dimensions. 124 Analogizing to the operation of pretri-
al services and the courthouse lock-up, it would not make much 
sense for pretrial services workers to test before arraignment 
those arrestees suspected of drug use and to test the rest after 
a judge ordered a drug screening at the arraignment. 
A similar rationale was followed in Willner v. 
Thornburgh 125 where the D.C. Circuit allowed mandatory 
urine testing of new applicants to the Justice Department for 
positions not subject to the supervision of a traditional office 
environment. The Willner court considered the role of the gov-
ernment as an employer in that applicants are "strangers" to 
their potential employer about whom the government must 
make a prediction as to future behavior without the added 
assurance of close post-hiring supervision. 126 Once hired a 
drug user may cost the government unwarranted expense, and 
once they are hired and working there may not be an oppor-
tunity for the government to supervise in any other way. 127 
While pretrial services is not an employer, it has similar 
needs and handicaps as the government did in Willner. At least 
until arraignment, the government acts on the probability that 
arrestees have voluntarily engaged in criminal activity justify-
ing the governments limited intrusions on liberty and privacy 
in order to ensure their cooperation with the judicial system. 
The court requires information from these strangers in order to 
make a prediction as to the arrestees' future conduct. Pretrial 
services has found a measure of supervisory relief in the pre-
arraignment and post-release testing procedures. 128 
c. No less intrusive method. Another factor pushing 
124. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666. 
125. 928 F.2d 1185 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 669 (1991). 
126. ld. at 1193. 
127. I d. at 1192. 
128. In Vauss v. United States, 365 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the court did not 
allow the release of an arrestee because no adequate program existed to ensure 
the arrestee's abstinence from drugs. Id. at 958. 
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towards the constitutionality of pre-arraignment drug testing is 
that no equally effective, but less intrusive means are available 
to achieve the government's objectives. While the Court stated 
that "reasonableness ... does not necessarily or invariably turn 
on the existence of alternative less intrusive means,"129 such 
an inquiry is another factor in the overall reasonableness as-
sessment. 130 The Skinner Court noted that it would not "sec-
ond-guess reasonable conclusions drawn ... after years of in-
vestigation and study."131 Investigation and study on the part 
of the federal government, among others, has shown that pro-
posed lesser restrictive alternatives, such as, voluntary report-
ing, narrowing the class of test subjects, and the use of more 
expensive confirmatory tests are not effective alternatives to 
the current mandatory and uniform program. 
In the experience of the District of Columbia, voluntary 
reporting has been shown to be highly inaccurate. In the D.C. 
program arrestees' responses as to their drug use were com-
pared to their urine test results and it was found that less than 
one-half of the arrestees testing drug-positive had admitted to 
drug use during the initial interview. 132 Narrowing the class 
of test subjects would essentially defeat the purpose of the tests 
since the connection between drugs and crime relates not only 
to drug-specific crimes, but to property and violent crimes as 
well. 
While some have questioned the accuracy of the EMIT 
drug analysis, courts find these tests to be highly accurate and 
generally accepted in the scientific community. 133 In Skinner, 
the Court noted, in relation to EMIT tests, that relevant evi-
dence need only have a tendency to make an important fact 
more or less probable. 134 As used by pretrial services, the 
test screens out those who use drugs so that the bail-setting 
judge may require them to go through a testing or treatment 
program. Moreover, all positive tests are rechecked to ensure 
129. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 629 n.9 (quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 
64 7 (1983)). 
130. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603, 610 (D.C. Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990). 
131. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 629. 
132. TOBERG, supra note 17, at 5-6. 
133. Stewart, supra note 15, at 73 n.24 and accompanying text (indicating that 
EMIT is 97% to 99% accurate when used with a confirmation test); see also Abell, 
supra note 3, at 947 n.19; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 610 n.3; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 
672 n.2. 
134. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 631-32. 
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accuracy. Using other types of tests, such as the GC/MS, would 
not significantly add to this process while substantially increas-
ing the cost of testing and training required to administer the 
tests. 135 
d. The nexus requirement. Another factor favoring the 
constitutionality of pre-arraignment drug testing is the 
strength of the connection between the means used toward 
achieving the goals of drug testing. The required strength of 
the nexus varies from context to context depending on the 
strength or weakness of other factors relating to the 
government's interest. 136 In Von Raab, the connection ap-
peared weak revealing that when a governmental interest is 
otherwise strong (e.g., national security) the Court will allow 
suspicionless testing in the absence of any evidence that a drug 
problem exists or that the steps taken by the govemment to 
address the problem will have any impact. While the 
government's interest in pre-arraignment drug testing may not 
be as strong as the interest in Von Raab, there is substantial 
evidence to support the reasonableness of the connection be-
tween the means and goals of pre-arraignment drug testing. 
In the experience of the District of Columbia program, and 
in other jurisdictions, there is significant evidence of a drug 
problem among the entire criminal population. Moreover, nu-
merous studies have shown that a connection does exist be-
tween drugs and crime and between drugs and the failure to 
reappear for trial. Data from the District of Columbia testing 
program revealed large and statistically significant differences 
in pretrial performance between those who participated in the 
drug testing program and those who did not. 137 While some 
may challenge the accuracy and interpretation of these stud-
ies, 138 the Court in United States v. Salerno signalled its reluc-
tance to challenge the accuracy of social science research. 139 
Judicial use and acceptance of pre-arraignment drug test-
135. See supra note 60. 
136. See Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185, 1188 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
112 S. Ct. 669 (1991). 
137. TOBERG, supra note 17, at 14; see also Douglas A. Sm;th et al., Drug Use 
and Pretrial Misconduct in New York City, 5 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 101 
(1989); MARY A. TOBORG ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRETRIAL URINE-TESTING 
IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: ITS USEFULNESS FOR RISK CLASSIFICATION AND AS A 
"SIGNALING DEVICE" FOR RELEASE RISK (1989). 
138. Rosen & Goldkamp, supra note 3, at 120-21. 
139. See Rosen & Goldkamp, supra note 3, at 121; United States v. Salerno, 4R1 
U.S. 739, 748 (1987); McCiesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
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ing data in the District of Columbia further supports the rea-
sonableness of the program. A majority of judges surveyed felt 
that the pretrial drug testing program is responsible for a re-
duction in pretrial criminality and failures to appear. 140 In 
addition, the vast majority of those judges surveyed place sig-
nificant reliance on the results of pre-arraignment testing in 
making release decisions. 141 
2. The arrestee's interest in not giving a urine sample. 
Balanced against the government's interest in using drug 
test information to make the pretrial release decisions is the 
arrestee's privacy interest. As mentioned earlier, the mandato-
ry drug testing involves two searches-the sample taking and 
the subsequent analysis. In determining the weight of individu-
al interests involved in the arrestee testing program a number 
of areas require consideration: ( 1) the reasonableness of the 
sample collection process; (2) the use of the test information 
once it is obtained by the government; and (3) the factor's tend-
ing to diminish an otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy. 
a. The reasonableness of the process. Although 
downplaying the privacy interests in Skinner and Von Raab, 
the Court noted that urination is "an excretory function tradi-
tionally shielded by great privacy"142 and that under some 
circumstances the urine collection process might be unjustifi-
ably intrusive. 143 However, urinating in a public restroom is a 
common activity where one does not expect the same degree of 
privacy as in one's home. An even lesser expectation of privacy 
attaches to the restroom in a courthouse lock-up where routine 
security needs naturally require greater openess. 
No matter how strong the government's interest is, an 
otherwise justifiable search cannot be conducted in an unrea-
sonable manner. The Court has looked favorably on govern-
ment attempts to reduce the intrusiveness of the actual urine 
collection process. In particular, both the Skinner and Von 
Raab Courts recognized the merit of procedures which do not 
call for direct observation of the urination, despite visual obser-
vation being the most desirable from a security viewpoint. 144 
140. Judicial Perspectives, supra note 34, at 19. 
141. !d. at 22-23. 
142. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626. 
14a. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671. 
144. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672-73 n.2. 
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(1) Direct observation. A recent lower court decision 
shows that the courts are taking seriously the intrusive nature 
of directly observing the act of urination. In National Treasury 
Employees Union v. Yeutter/ 45 the D.C. circuit court invali-
dated a requirement of observation because the government 
had taken other precautions to ensure sample integrity such 
as, collecting excess clothing, dye in the toilet water, and listen-
ing for the sounds of urination. 146 In Von Raab, the Court ob-
served that such precautions were adequate to ensure sample 
integrity. 147 The testing program in the District of Columbia, 
and all other jurisdictions, requires the direct visual observa-
tion of the urination by pretrial services workers. 
While it may be unworkable in the lock-up situation to 
take the kind of precautions undertaken in the employment 
context, other mitigation measures may be appropriate. For 
instance, in the District of Columbia drug testing procedures 
for juveniles, pretrial services workers view the urination 
through the reflection of a rounded mirror much like those 
used to watch for shoplifters in retail stores. There is still ob-
servation under such conditions, but it is not direct and it 
shows an effort to minimize the impact of the test procedure. 
(2) Observation by uninvolved third parties. Another 
matter of concern is the visual observation of the urination by 
uninvolved third parties. 148 In the District of Columbia pro-
gram, other arrestees can observe the sample collection process. 
However, the process is not viewed by members of the opposite 
sex. In addition, there are legitimate safety concerns for the 
pretrial services workers in being isolated with arrestees. 
Moreover, the presence of others helps avoid the possibility 
that there will be false claims of abuse by the arrestees. Also, 
in the District of Columbia, the lock-up urinals can be directly 
observed by the inmates at all times, not only during the sam-
ple taking procedures. 
(3) Consent. A mitigating factor in the testing proce-
dure is that the arrestees are asked to voluntarily submit a 
urine sample. While the consent process may or may not rise to 
145. 918 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
146. !d. at 976. 
147. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 676. 
148. Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding that in-
mates and female nurses could view the sample taking which significantly height-
ened the humiliating nature of the test when no legitimate need existed). 
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the level of consent required that will result in a waiver of 
Fourth Amendment rights, it serves to reduce the impact of the 
intrusion by minimizing any "unsettling show of authori-
ty".149 The effectiveness of the consent may be questioned, 
however, because of the "forced" or "coercive" nature of the 
entire arrest process. 
In order for consent to be an effective waiver of Fourth 
Amendment rights the government must prove that such con-
sent was "free" and "voluntary". 150 In some cases pretrial ser-
vices workers may tell the arrestees that if they do not consent, 
the judge will order them to take the test later, or that such a 
refusal may reflect unfavorably in the pretrial release hearing. 
The courts are split as to whether such threats constitute coer-
cion.151 Ultimately, as in "special needs" analysis, the Court 
uses a totality of the circumstances approach in deciding 
whether consent has been validly given. 152 Individual traits 
such as education, maturity, intoxication, or knowledge of the 
law are relevant. Consideration of such factors must be made 
according to each individual, making it difficult to assess the 
overall validity of the consent made by many persons in the 
mass testing procedures of Pretrial Services. 153 Nevertheless, 
the consent under these conditions can be plausibly construed 
as mitigating factor in the special needs balancing test. 
b. Use of the drug test results. While the testing of the 
urine is a search, pretrial services take steps to minimize the 
intrusion. The most important factor under this section is that 
the tests are used for non-criminal purposes by a neutral fact-
finding agency. Opponents of these drug screening programs 
argue that because the information gained may be used to 
impeach the arrestee at trial, there is a law enforcement pur-
pose related to the testing program. However, such a charge is 
149. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 n.2 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648, 657 (1979)). 
150. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 247-48 (1973); see also Rosen & 
Goldkamp, supra note 3, at 171-174 (concluding that some type of written informed 
consent form is the surest course). 
151. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968) (concluding that 
consent is not free and voluntary when given only after the official conducting the 
search asserted that he possessed a warrant); United States v. Boukater, 409 F.2d 
537 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that threatening to obtain a warrant may be coercive 
unless the officer (1) actually has grounds to obtain a warrant, or (2) makes Rtate-
ment in non-threatening manner). 
152. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. 
153. See Rosen & Goldkamp, supra note 3, at 171-72. 
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unlikely to place the program in a law enforcement category 
because the Supreme Court has consistently allowed evidence 
excluded for substantive purposes to be used as impeachment 
evidence against a defendant. 154 
Moreover, the Skinner Court approved a drug testing 
scheme which arguably allowed for the release of drug test 
results for law enforcement purposes rather than mere im-
peachment. The Court found that law enforcement was not the 
testing program's "primary" purpose nor was it a "pretext" 
towards that end. 155 On the other hand, the District of Co-
lumbia forbids by statute the use of information acquired by 
pretrial services to be used for the guilt phase of any ad-
versarial proceeding. Moreover, the information gathered 
through drug testing is stringently controlled so that only cer-
tain non-adversarial court personel have access to it. 
Additionally, the tests are designed to find only the pres-
ence of specific drugs so that other personal information which 
could be discovered through drug testing is not. Most impor-
tantly, access to the information is strictly controlled by law 
and agency procedure so that only those within the court who 
need to know (excluding the defense and prosecutors unless the 
defendant consents) the results will have access to it. 
An aggravating factor under this heading is that it is nec-
essary to ask personal medical information, such as, whether or 
not the arrestee is taking medications. In Skinner and Von 
Raab such questions were only asked after a positive test re-
sult. It is possible, however, that the arrestee has a reduced 
expectation of privacy in the questions asked about drug use 
and possible cross reactants because the information relating to 
other personal matters that may bear on arrestee stability is 
routinely asked. Moreover, asking questions as to medications 
only after a false positive could impede operations of pretrial 
services information gathering function. 
c. Diminished expectations of privacy. Arrestees have a 
diminished expectation of privacy because of the context of the 
bail-setting process. The Skinner Court observed that certain 
154. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (indicating that illegally 
seized evidence may be used by prosecutor to impeach defendant on cross-exami-
nation). In Jones v. United States, 548 A.2d 35 (D.C. 1988), the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals, based on generally accepted reliability of EMIT results and 
facts put in issue by the defendant, allowed admission of evidence relating to the 
defendant's positive pretrial drug test result. 
155. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621 n.5. 
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employees in the public sector and in highly regulated indus-
tries have a diminished expectation of privacy, especially where 
the employees have been the objects of government regulation. 
While initially aimed at the workplace, the "highly regulated 
industry" doctrine has been applied to such individuals as jock-
eys, prison inmates, and most recently to employees in the 
railroad industry. 
One commentator suggests that the lower court cases of 
Shoemaker v. Handel 156 and McDonell v. Hunter157 are 
among the most influential cases in the area of upholding the 
constitutionality of suspicionless drug testing. 158 These two 
cases come from the administrative search realm of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. They are relevant because the 
Skinner and Von Raab Courts favorably cited Shoemaker and 
other similar cases while at the same time not limiting itself to 
the requirements of the administrative search exception to the 
warrant and probable cause. 159 
Shoemaker dealt with the suspicionless testing of jockeys, 
among others, aimed at maintaining the integrity and public 
confidence in the New Jersey horse racing industry. The Shoe-
maker court applied the administrative search exception to the 
individuals in the industry because they were essentially the 
object of the pervasive regulation in the industry and they 
voluntarily accepted employment in the industry. 160 McDonell 
dealt with several categories of drug testing one of which was 
suspicionless testing of guards having daily contact with pris-
oners. The McDonell court analogized the government object in 
Shoemaker to the government's interest in the security of pris-
ons arguing that prison safety was at least as important as the 
goals involving the horse racing industry. 161 
The Salerno Court recognized the "regulatory" nature of 
pre-trial release decisions. 162 Like prisons, the process of bail-
setting can be a "regulated industry". In Skinner actual notice 
of drug testing in the industry to further safety interests 
seemed not to be required. A mere knowledge that health and 
156. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986). 
157. 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987). 
158. Warner, supra note 3, at 188-89. 
159. See Mass, supra note 3, at 241. 
160. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142. 
161. McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1308. 
162. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987). 
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fitness were part of the job was sufficient. 163 Like employees 
in the railroad industries, arrestees have been the target of 
legislation which ought to apprise them of the realities of the 
bailment system. Arrestees should be aware that they are re-
quired to give assurances that they will return for trial and 
that they will be law abiding while on release. Thus, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that arrestees have a diminished expecta-
tion of privacy by virtue of their being held within the bailment 
system. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The practice of testing for drug use in order to allow courts 
to make a more informed pretrial release decision is becoming 
more pervasive. With the advent of the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Skinner and Von Raab, it is likely that these programs 
will pass constitutional muster as long as they are not arbi-
trary. However, the treatment of these mass drug screenings by 
the courts is highly fact-specific. The use of direct visual moni-
toring of the arrestee's act of urination and the requirement 
that arrestees reveal the use of any medications in advance of 
the test result may enhance the intrusiveness of the search. 
However, by carefully structuring the testing program to miti-
gate as much as possible any intrusions on the arrestee's priva-
cy interest, pre-arraignment drug testing withstands Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny under a special needs analysis. 
Russell C. Skousen 
163. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627. 
